美国空军飞机战伤修理的发展及其对我们的启示

论述了美国空军战伤修理在方针、组织、培训、战伤修理规程、备件及工具箱、设计、试验数据库、新技术开发和常用抢修技术等方面的发展。同时提出了我空军战伤修理在这些方面的发展建议。     

基于衰减记忆的地形辅助导航算法

地形辅助导航是解决惯性导航系统定位误差随时间不断增大的缺点的重要方法之一。提出了基于衰减记忆的地形辅助导航算法,算法使用了一个新的相关算子,根据量测值存在的历史时间长短,对量测值赋以不同的权值,用一个递归表达式递归地计算相关值。该算法在提高定位精度的同时减少了计算量和存储空间,从而提高计算速度,并连续输出定位结果。仿真结果表明该算法的正确匹配率、均方根误差和圆概率误差均优于TERCOM算法。     

异构资源类型下多无人机任务分配

针对多无人机在执行侦察、打击任务的过程中携带任务资源的异构性,以及任务对于异构资源的要求,设计了一种改进的基于共识的捆绑算法(consensus-based bundle algorithm, CBBA)。考虑任务价值、任务执行时间窗以及航程代价等条件建立了多无人机对地目标侦察、打击任务分配模型。利用K-medoids聚类分析方法对多无人机进行基于距离和携带资源平衡的聚类,以解决多无人机对于异构资源类型的要求。对打击任务进行子任务生成,并利用改进后的CBBA求解所建立的任务分配模型,通过对比仿真实验验证了算法的可行性和有效性。     

A genetic algorithm with neighborhood search for the resource‐constrained project scheduling problem

The resource‐constrained project scheduling problem (RCPSP) consists of a set of non‐preemptive activities that follow precedence relationship and consume resources. Under the limited amount of the resources, the objective of RCPSP is to find a schedule of the activities to minimize the project makespan. This article presents a new genetic algorithm (GA) by incorporating a local search strategy in GA operators. The local search strategy improves the efficiency of searching the solution space while keeping the randomness of the GA approach. Extensive numerical experiments show that the proposed GA with neighborhood search works well regarding solution quality and computational time compared with existing algorithms in the RCPSP literature, especially for the instances with a large number of activities. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Technical note: Find a hidden “treasure”

This paper deals with a two searchers game and it investigates the problem of how the possibility of finding a hidden object simultaneously by players influences their behavior. Namely, we consider the following two‐sided allocation non‐zero‐sum game on an integer interval [1,n]. Two teams (Player 1 and 2) want to find an immobile object (say, a treasure) hidden at one of n points. Each point i ∈ [1,n] is characterized by a detection parameter λ_i (μ_i) for Player 1 (Player 2) such that p_i(1 ? exp(?λ_ix_i)) (p_i(1 ? exp(?μ_iy_i))) is the probability that Player 1 (Player 2) discovers the hidden object with amount of search effort x_i (y_i) applied at point i where p_i ∈ (0,1) is the probability that the object is hidden at point i. Player 1 (Player 2) undertakes the search by allocating the total amount of effort X(Y). The payoff for Player 1 (Player 2) is 1 if he detects the object but his opponent does not. If both players detect the object they can share it proportionally and even can pay some share to an umpire who takes care that the players do not cheat each other, namely Player 1 gets q₁ and Player 2 gets q₂ where q₁ + q₂ ≤ 1. The Nash equilibrium of this game is found and numerical examples are given. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Constrained minimax optimization of continuous search efforts for the detection of a stationary target

Analytical resolution of search theory problems, as formalized by B.O. Koopman, may be applied with some model extension to various resource management issues. However, a fundamental prerequisite is the knowledge of the prior target density. Though this assumption has the definite advantage of simplicity, its drawback is clearly that target reactivity is not taken into account. As a preliminary step towards reactive target study stands the problem of resource planning under a min–max game context. This paper is related to Nakai's work about the game planning of resources for the detection of a stationary target. However, this initial problem is extended by adding new and more general constraints, allowing a more realistic modeling of the target and searcher behaviors. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Cost allocation rules for elastic single‐attribute situations

Many cooperative games, especially ones stemming from resource pooling in queueing or inventory systems, are based on situations in which each player is associated with a single attribute (a real number representing, say, a demand) and in which the cost to optimally serve any sum of attributes is described by an elastic function (which means that the per‐demand cost is non‐increasing in the total demand served). For this class of situations, we introduce and analyze several cost allocation rules: the proportional rule, the serial cost sharing rule, the benefit‐proportional rule, and various Shapley‐esque rules. We study their appeal with regard to fairness criteria such as coalitional rationality, benefit ordering, and relaxations thereof. After showing the impossibility of combining coalitional rationality and benefit ordering, we show for each of the cost allocation rules which fairness criteria it satisfies. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 271–286, 2017     

Probabilistic resource pooling games

We study a setting with a single type of resource and with several players, each associated with a single resource (of this type). Unavailability of these resources comes unexpectedly and with player‐specific costs. Players can cooperate by reallocating the available resources to the ones that need the resources most and let those who suffer the least absorb all the costs. We address the cost savings allocation problem with concepts of cooperative game theory. In particular, we formulate a probabilistic resource pooling game and study them on various properties. We show that these games are not necessarily convex, do have non‐empty cores, and are totally balanced. The latter two are shown via an interesting relationship with Böhm‐Bawerk horse market games. Next, we present an intuitive class of allocation rules for which the resulting allocations are core members and study an allocation rule within this class of allocation rules with an appealing fairness property. Finally, we show that our results can be applied to a spare parts pooling situation.     

The resource-conflict debate revisited: Untangling the case of farmer–herdsman clashes in the North Central region of Nigeria

The resource debate is easily discerned as part of the ongoing history of farmer–herdsman conflict in the North Central region of Nigeria. Scarcity theorists are adept at linking scarcity with the onset of livelihood conflict while on the other hand resource abundance pundits insist it is profusion and not scarcity that impels conflict. This article traverses these wrangles and proceeds to downplay the resource polemic altogether. It is proposed that the resource debate, despite its profoundness, presents a narrow reading of farmer–herdsman clashes in Nigeria’s North Central region. It is suggested that a number of other factors, including elite land grabbing, ethno-religious identity construction, weak state capabilities, the citizenship question, corrupt traditional institutions, the lack of an effective land tenure system and a widespread culture of impunity, make for better readings of the conflict. Owing to the negative impacts of the conflict on state and society, it is recommended that the state in Nigeria should commit itself to addressing the citizenship question, strengthening the capabilities of security institutions, extirpating the culture of impunity and revaluing its policy on land redistribution.     

Resource rents,institutions, and violent civil conflicts

Natural resources have been blamed for inducing slow growth and sparking civil conflicts and violence. This paper first develops a model to account for the hazard of armed civil conflicts as a manifestation of the natural resource curse, which is mediated by the quality of both economic and political institutions. We then use recently published data on institutional quality and natural resource rents to measure the potential impact of the resource curse on violent civil conflicts using a panel of data for over 100 countries in the period 1970–2010. Our model explicitly accounts for the role of good economic and political institutions in deterring the recourse to violence as well as the extent to which they might weaken the resource rents effect.